US President Donald Trump has enacted one of the most consequential sanctions laws passed by Congress this year — and then set almost all of it aside in the same document. In an executive order signed on Friday 16 October and posted by the White House late that evening, Trump implemented the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, then immediately waived the tariffs and most of the sanctions it required. The move, trending per news coverage across US, Indian, British and international outlets on 17 October, spares the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas — a group that includes India and China — from a 100% duty that had been due to take effect on Sunday 18 October.
The decision caps a week in which the administration has moved sharply away from the sanctions-first approach Congress intended, and toward a strategy centred on bringing down fuel prices at home. It has also opened a public rift with lawmakers from both parties, with Ukraine, and with the law's own namesake coalition in Congress. This article explains what the order does, what it does not do, why the White House acted, and what to watch next.
What the order actually does
The Graham Act, which Trump signed into law on 18 September 2026, gave the president 30 days to impose a sweeping package of tariffs and sanctions on Russia and on the countries and facilitators that keep buying its energy. That 30-day clock ran out on Sunday 18 October. The executive order meets the letter of the deadline by putting the law into effect — and then uses the law's own waiver provision to suspend its sharpest measures.
As written, the order would have raised the duty on goods from the five largest importers of crude oil and natural gas of Russian origin by 100% if the country knowingly made new purchases of Russian crude oil or natural gas on or after 18 October 2026. It imposed the same 100% increase on goods from the top five facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion. It also raised the duty on goods from Russia itself by 500%. The order does not name any country, but reporting on the legislation has consistently identified India and China as the largest buyers in the frame, alongside other major importers.
Section 4 of the order then suspends those measures. It waives the application of the duties provided for in sections 112 and 113 of the Act, and it waives most of the law's sanctions on foreign persons, covering sections 102(a), 102(d) and 102(e), sections 103 to 111, and section 117. The waivers remain in effect until the President or the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the US Trade Representative, as appropriate, determine that further action is appropriate. In other words, the suspension is open-ended, but it is not permanent: a future decision could revive the measures.
Trump also sent Congress the written certification the law requires, stating that the waiver is in the national interests of the United States, together with a report explaining the basis for that certification. That certification was issued under Section 115 of the Act, which authorises the president to waive sanctions provisions, restrictions and duties under the law. The US Trade Representative will keep monitoring Russian oil purchases and report to the president on whether further action is needed.
The diesel deal behind the decision
The waiver did not arrive out of nowhere. A week earlier, on 9 October, Trump announced a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin under which Russia would supply diesel fuel to American and global markets. In a post on his Truth Social platform, Trump said the agreement followed a highly successful discussion with Putin, and that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel fuel, followed by another 500,000 tonnes during November and 1,000,000 tonnes immediately thereafter. A further 3,000,000 tonnes would follow within a short period, depending on the condition of Russia's diesel refineries.
The Treasury Department backed the arrangement with a general licence on 9 October allowing transactions in Russian-origin diesel, with the authorisation running through 7 April 2027. The Kremlin confirmed the deal, with Putin saying he was confident it would have a positive impact on the global economy. The administration presented the arrangement as emergency relief for fuel markets, with Trump arguing that diesel prices for Americans and the world would fall fast.
The context is the price at the pump. US diesel prices have been running at exceptionally high levels — around $6.23 to $6.28 a gallon on national averages reported during the week — after spiking during the US war with Iran earlier this year. Diesel matters far beyond car drivers: it powers trucks, farm machinery, freight and heating, so its price feeds directly into food prices, delivery costs and broader inflation. With midterm congressional elections scheduled for 3 November, fuel costs have become a central political liability for the Republican Party as it tries to hold its thin majorities in the Senate and the House.
Energy analysts, however, have been sceptical that the Russian diesel will move prices in time or at sufficient scale. Some traders have noted that the volumes announced, while large in headline tonnage, amount to only a modest share of US diesel consumption when spread over months, and that the smallest deliveries arrive first, when relief is most needed. One widely cited estimate put the short-term effect at a reduction of roughly 10 to 20 cents a gallon, while others questioned whether Russia — whose refining capacity has been damaged by Ukrainian strikes — could deliver the promised volumes on schedule at all. That scepticism matters, because the political case for the waiver rests heavily on the promise of cheaper fuel.
Why the White House says it acted
The administration's stated justification is national interest: the certification to Congress says suspending the measures serves the interests of the United States. The surrounding reporting points to three linked motives. The first is fuel prices. The White House has argued that imposing 100% duties on the largest buyers of Russian energy, on top of already-elevated oil prices, would have pushed energy costs higher still — the opposite of what it is trying to achieve before the midterms.
The second motive is the diesel deal itself. Enforcing the Graham Act's penalties on Russian energy trade while simultaneously importing Russian diesel would have been legally and politically incoherent. The waiver clears the way for the diesel shipments to proceed without the administration penalising the very trade it has just arranged.
The third motive is diplomatic flexibility. By waiving rather than repealing, the administration keeps the tariff threat in reserve as leverage. The order preserves presidential discretion: the duties exist on paper, suspended, and could in principle be reactivated if the administration judges that further action is appropriate. Supporters of that reading argue that the waiver gives Washington room to negotiate — with Moscow, with Kyiv, and with major buyers such as India and China — without immediately triggering a trade shock. Critics reply that a threat the president has just declined to use, days before it was due to bite, carries far less weight than one he was prepared to enforce.
Congress pushes back
The waiver has drawn sharp, bipartisan criticism in Congress, where the Graham Act passed with broad support in both chambers. The House passed the legislation with a majority of Republicans and 58 Democrats, a margin its supporters took as a clear signal of congressional intent: to apply economic pressure on Russia and on the chief enablers of its war, above all China, in order to strengthen the US negotiating position for a settlement in Ukraine.
Days before the waiver, a bipartisan group of 12 senators — including six Republicans — wrote to Trump on 13 October calling the diesel deal a betrayal of US allies and demanding that he enforce the Graham Act and sanction Russia. Their letter argued that both chambers had passed the legislation with resounding bipartisan votes, demonstrating Congress's intent and granting the president the authorities to broker a just and fair peace, and that those authorities required him to apply economic pressure on Russia and its enablers to bring a swift end to the conflict. Separately, a bipartisan group of 22 House members sent a letter demanding immediate and full implementation of the law, revocation of the diesel licence, and written answers by 18 October about any planned delays or exemptions.
House supporters of the sanctions package also urged Trump to enforce the legislation. Representative Jake Auchincloss, a Massachusetts Democrat, described the diesel deal and the undercutting of Ukraine's self-defence as shameful and dangerous, and argued that it was critical for Congress to make its will known and then work that will. Representative Don Beyer, another Democrat, wrote that the move betrayed Ukraine and defied the clear congressional intent of legislation designed to punish Russia for its war of aggression. The White House did not provide an immediate detailed explanation of how the waiver served the national interest beyond the certification itself.
Whether Congress can do anything further is an open question. Lawmakers could attempt new legislation to constrain the waiver or to force implementation, but any such effort would face the president's veto and the compressed calendar before the midterms. For now, the pushback is largely political — a public record of dissent that could shape how the administration handles the next decision point.
Ukraine's reaction and the energy ceasefire row
Ukraine's response has been the most pointed of all. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, meeting European leaders in Brussels on Friday, said the diesel deal would mean cash would start flowing back into Russia. He has sharply criticised Trump's willingness to strike business deals with Putin at Ukraine's expense, calling Putin real evil and questioning how Trump could be friends with him. Zelenskyy has defended Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries as a critical part of the strategy to put pressure on Russia's economy, which has financed its nearly five-year war against Ukraine.
The dispute sits on top of a collapsing energy ceasefire. Last weekend, Trump announced that Ukraine and Russia had agreed not to target each other's energy facilities. Zelenskyy initially said he was willing to abide by such a pause, but after Russian attacks continued, he said earlier in the week that Ukraine would no longer hold off on striking Russian refineries. Trump has blamed Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries for rising prices at the pump, and has said he is not a big fan of Zelenskyy. The White House has also been reported — though not officially confirmed — to have withheld intelligence from Ukraine on incoming Russian ballistic missile strikes and to have throttled Starshield, the military version of the Starlink satellite network, to prevent its use on fast drones. Neither claim has been officially confirmed.
The wider context is a war approaching a critical juncture for Kyiv. Ukraine's resumption of strikes on Russian refineries and Russia's moves against European firms have both raised the stakes in recent weeks, and the waiver lands in the middle of that escalation. For Kyiv, the message of the waiver is that the economic pressure Congress voted for will not arrive. For Moscow, it is breathing room — and, if the diesel deal proceeds, revenue.
What it means for India and China
For India and China, the immediate effect is relief. Both countries are among the largest buyers of Russian crude oil and gas, and both would have faced a 100% duty on their goods entering the United States if the Graham Act had been enforced as written. India in particular had been bracing for the 18 October deadline, and the waiver removes — for now — the most severe tariff threat hanging over its exports.
The timing is significant for India. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is visiting India from 17 to 22 October, with stops in Mumbai and Jamnagar focused on energy cooperation, commercial investment and broader economic ties. The first phase of a US-India trade deal has been finalised and is in legal drafting, with dairy access reported as the biggest remaining hurdle. Under the framework announced in February, Washington cut its reciprocal tariff on Indian goods from 25% to 18% and removed an additional 25% duty linked to India's purchases of Russian oil, while India committed to eliminate or reduce tariffs on US industrial goods and a range of farm products. India's trade secretary has said negotiations are moving in the right direction, and both sides have said they hope to conclude and sign at the earliest possible time.
Analysts have cautioned, however, that relief may come with strings attached. One trade analyst quoted in reporting on the visit warned that Washington's decision to buy Russian diesel had raised hopes India would avoid tariffs over its Russian oil purchases, but that the United States could still use the threat of such duties to press New Delhi into an unequal trade deal. The waiver preserves exactly that leverage: the duties are suspended, not abolished, and the administration can point to them in negotiations. India will also be watching whether the waiver holds, whether diesel volumes actually flow, and whether Congress succeeds in forcing a different course.
For China, the calculus is similar but the politics are sharper. The Graham Act was explicitly framed in Congress as a tool to pressure Beijing as well as Moscow, and the waiver removes that pressure for now. Beijing has not publicly welcomed the move in the reporting so far, but the practical effect — no 100% duty on its goods over Russian energy purchases — is unambiguous.
What the waiver does not do
It is important to be precise about what has and has not happened. The waiver does not repeal the Graham Act. The law remains on the books, the duties remain defined in the executive order, and the president retains the authority to reactivate them. It does not lift all Russia sanctions: it suspends the specific duties and sanctions provisions listed in the order, while the broader sanctions architecture built up since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 remains in place. And it does not settle the underlying policy question — whether economic pressure or energy-price relief should take priority — it merely chooses relief for now.
Nor does the waiver guarantee that diesel prices will fall. The deliveries depend on Russian refineries that have been damaged by war, on shipping and logistics, and on global market reactions that are hard to predict. If the volumes arrive late or in smaller quantities than promised, the political benefit the administration is counting on may not materialise, while the diplomatic cost — strained relations with Kyiv, with Congress and with European allies — will already have been paid.
What to watch next
Five things will determine whether this waiver becomes a brief pause or a lasting pivot. First, the diesel itself: whether the promised 300,000 tonnes arrive promptly, whether the November and later shipments follow, and whether US pump prices respond. Second, the US Trade Representative's monitoring: what its reports say about Russian oil purchases, and whether the administration uses them to justify keeping the waiver or reviving the duties.
Third, Congress: whether bipartisan critics move from letters to legislation, and whether the midterm campaign changes the political calculus for either party. Fourth, Rubio's visit to India and the trade negotiations around it: whether the waiver smooths the path to a signed first-phase deal, or whether the suspended tariff threat becomes a bargaining chip that complicates the talks. And fifth, Ukraine: whether Kyiv continues its refinery strikes, whether European allies increase their own pressure on Moscow, and whether the energy ceasefire can be revived in any form.
The Graham Act was designed to force a choice: maximum economic pressure on Russia and its energy customers, on a fixed timetable. With this waiver, the administration has chosen a different path — pressure deferred, diesel imported, and the tariff threat held in reserve. The law's supporters in Congress, and Ukraine's leaders, have made clear they regard that as the wrong choice. The coming weeks will show whether the bet on cheaper fuel pays off, and whether the suspended sanctions return in a stronger or weaker form. Sources: White House executive order implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (16 October 2026); USA TODAY reporting on the waiver and congressional reaction; Reuters reporting on the India-US trade deal and Rubio visit; IANS and ANI reporting on the executive order; CBS News reporting on the waiver and the diesel deal (per news coverage, October 2026).