Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has triggered a diplomatic backlash from China and South Korea after sending ritual offerings to Yasukuni Shrine during its autumn festival, reviving one of Asia's most sensitive historical disputes. Beijing said it "firmly opposes and strongly condemns" the move, while Seoul expressed "deep disappointment and regret" — setting the stage for a tense test of relations with Japan's new government.

Takaichi, who took office in October 2025, did not visit the shrine in person. Instead, on October 17 — the opening day of the shrine's three-day autumn festival — she sent a masakaki ritual offering of evergreen twigs under her own name rather than her official title. Then, on October 19, the festival's final day, she sent an additional monetary offering known as tamagushi-ryo, paid out of her own pocket, according to Kyodo News. Two senior political figures — Land Minister Tatsunori Ibayashi and LDP Election Strategy chief Nishimura Yasutoshi — visited the shrine separately.

For background on the Takaichi government's domestic turbulence, see Japan's Farm Minister Resigns in First Cabinet Resignation for Takaichi Government; for the state of Japan's relations with Beijing, see US and China Reach Trade Framework in Kuala Lumpur: 100% Tariffs Off the Table.

Background: why Yasukuni Shrine is so controversial

Yasukuni Shrine, located in central Tokyo, honours approximately 2.466 million Japanese war dead — soldiers and others who died in the country's conflicts from the late 19th century through World War II. But in 1978, the shrine enshrined 14 Class-A war criminals convicted by the postwar International Military Tribunal for the Far East, including wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. That decision transformed the shrine into a lightning rod.

For China and South Korea — both of which suffered Japanese military aggression and colonial rule in the 20th century — official gestures toward Yasukuni are seen not as ordinary remembrance of the fallen but as endorsements of a sanitised view of history. China's Foreign Ministry has consistently described the shrine as "a spiritual tool and symbol of Japanese militarist war of aggression." Japanese prime ministers have faced this dilemma for decades: visits or offerings play well with conservative supporters at home but invariably draw condemnation from Beijing and Seoul, complicating diplomacy.

The controversy is not abstract. Previous prime ministerial visits have been followed by diplomatic freezes, cancelled summits and public protests in both neighbouring countries. Even gestures short of a personal visit — ritual offerings sent during the shrine's spring and autumn festivals, or on the August 15 anniversary of Japan's wartime surrender — have routinely provoked formal protests.

What happened: a double offering

Takaichi's move was carefully calibrated. Before taking office, she had been a regular visitor to Yasukuni Shrine — her conservative credentials were well known. Since becoming prime minister in October 2025, however, she has refrained from in-person visits, sending ritual offerings instead at the spring and autumn festivals and on August 15. The October 2026 pattern followed the same formula, but with an extra step.

On October 17, the opening day of the autumn festival, she sent the masakaki offering — sacred evergreen twigs used in Shinto rituals — under her own name rather than under her title as prime minister. The distinction matters diplomatically: Japanese leaders often try to thread the needle between personal observance and official endorsement by signing in a private capacity. On October 19, the festival's final day, she went further, sending an additional monetary offering (tamagushi-ryo) from her own funds.

Meanwhile, Land Minister Tatsunori Ibayashi and LDP Election Strategy chief Nishimura Yasutoshi made in-person visits to the shrine — a reminder that Takaichi's restraint was personal rather than party-wide, and that the offerings sat within a broader display of conservative political observance.

China's response: condemnation and protest

Beijing's reaction was swift and sharp. The Chinese embassy in Tokyo condemned the move, and Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Beijing "firmly opposes and strongly condemns" the "negative moves." Mao called Yasukuni "a spiritual tool and symbol of Japanese militarist war of aggression" that honours the 14 convicted Class-A war criminals, and said China had lodged "serious and strong protests" with Japan.

The language — "firmly opposes and strongly condemns" — is among the strongest in Beijing's diplomatic vocabulary short of punitive action. The protest signals that China views even the offering of ritual twigs and money, not just an in-person visit, as an unacceptable official gesture. For Beijing, the private-capacity framing does not change the fact that the person making the offering is Japan's sitting prime minister.

South Korea's response: disappointment and a history lesson

Seoul's response was milder in tone but pointed in substance. South Korea's Foreign Ministry said it felt "deep disappointment and regret," and urged Japanese leaders to "squarely face history." The phrasing reflects Seoul's long-standing position: that Japan's reconciliation with its neighbours depends on a frank reckoning with its colonial and wartime record.

The timing is delicate for South Korea. Seoul and Tokyo have spent the past few years rebuilding a security and economic partnership strained by historical disputes — cooperation that both governments, and Washington, consider essential amid regional tensions. Yasukuni episodes have a history of derailing such progress, and South Korean domestic politics makes it nearly impossible for any government to let an offering go unanswered.

Why it matters: a familiar cycle with fresh stakes

The episode is significant for three reasons. First, it shows the limits of Takaichi's balancing act. By not visiting in person but sending double offerings, she appears to have tried to satisfy conservative supporters at home without provoking the full-scale fallout a visit would bring. Beijing's strong condemnation suggests the strategy bought her less diplomatic room than hoped.

Second, it arrives at a moment when East Asian diplomacy is already fraught. China's relations with Japan remain strained over Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute and export controls; any Yasukuni episode adds historical grievance to an already crowded agenda of disagreements.

Third, the episode tests whether the recent stabilisation in Japan–South Korea ties can survive a historical dispute flare-up. The pattern of the past two decades is that each Yasukuni controversy sets back cooperation for months or years. Both governments now have incentives to keep this episode contained — but domestic opinion in both countries may pull the other way.

Key facts

  • Who: Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (in office since October 2025).
  • What: a masakaki ritual offering of evergreen twigs on October 17, 2026 (opening day of Yasukuni's autumn festival), sent under her own name; plus a monetary offering (tamagushi-ryo) paid from her own pocket on October 19, the festival's final day.
  • She did not visit in person — she has refrained from in-person visits since taking office, sending offerings at the spring and autumn festivals and August 15 instead.
  • Others: Land Minister Tatsunori Ibayashi and LDP Election Strategy chief Nishimura Yasutoshi visited the shrine in person.
  • China: embassy condemnation; Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Beijing "firmly opposes and strongly condemns" the moves and lodged "serious and strong protests."
  • South Korea: Foreign Ministry expressed "deep disappointment and regret" and urged Japan's leaders to "squarely face history."
  • The shrine: Yasukuni honours ~2.466 million war dead, including 14 convicted Class-A war criminals enshrined in 1978.

What happens next

Diplomatically, the immediate question is whether Beijing escalates beyond words. Past Yasukuni controversies have sometimes been followed by cancelled bilateral meetings, delayed summits, or a chill in people-to-people exchanges — but Beijing also weighs its economic interests in Japan. The "serious and strong protests" lodged through diplomatic channels may be the extent of the official response, with the real cost showing up in the tone of future high-level contacts.

For Seoul, the question is how the episode interacts with ongoing efforts to deepen Japan–South Korea cooperation on security and supply chains. The Foreign Ministry's statement was carefully worded to register disapproval without rupturing dialogue — a sign that both capitals may want to contain the damage.

For Takaichi herself, the episode clarifies her political positioning. Her pre-office regular visits to Yasukuni were a signal to her conservative base; her in-office offerings-only approach is a compromise between that base and diplomatic reality. The backlash from Beijing suggests the compromise satisfies neither side completely — a familiar outcome in the long history of the Yasukuni dilemma, and one likely to recur at the next festival season.